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ABSTRACT
Two categories of alienage-jurisdiction cases have proven troublesome: cases
involving permanent-resident aliens and cases involving international corporations.
Jurisdiction in these categories depends upon the construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1332’s
deeming provisions. The permanent-resident deeming provision and the corporate
deeming provision operate uncontroversially to remove certain cases from federal
jurisdiction, but controversy exists as to what extent they create jurisdiction that did not
exist before the amendments that added the deeming provisions. The results and
analytical approaches in these categories have varied, and the resulting confusion is
unsatisfactory. The cases in this area are plagued by a structural flaw—while framing
their analyses in terms of “clear” or “unambiguous” text, the courts have actually
imposed no construction at all, instead jumping extratextually to the what-wouldCongress-have-wanted question. Further, the courts faced with cases in each category
have decided the cases without reference to the other category.
My solution is a modest one but provides the consistency needed in a
jurisdictional inquiry. I give the words “shall be deemed” a consistent construction in
the two deeming provisions and resolve the missing-word problem that lurks in the
background. Under my solution, the words “shall be deemed” perform a simple function
in the deeming provisions—they confer State citizenship on certain litigants. But they do
not strip a party of preexisting alien status. When construed this way and combined with
the § 1332(a) jurisdiction-granting subcategories, the deeming provisions create no
jurisdiction that did not exist before the deeming provisions.
My solution provides several benefits. First, it provides the consistency and
coherence needed in a jurisdictional inquiry. Second, it is textually faithful and gives
effect to the similar language used in the deeming provisions and differing language used
elsewhere in § 1332. And third, it avoids the constitutional problems that arise under
alternative construction. To be sure, one might conjure up scenarios where, in the view
of the conjurer, exercising jurisdiction would better serve the purposes of alienage
jurisdiction. But those scenarios are rare, and desirability of results cannot distort the
task—giving effect to the statute. Among permissible solutions, mine yields the best
results. It simply is not an acceptable method of statutory interpretation to determine:
when no construction yields the construer’s desired result in every case, the statute need
be given no construction except what Congress should have intended in each case.
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Introduction
Two categories of alienage-jurisdiction cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 have proven
troublesome. The first category involves permanent-resident aliens, the second involves
international corporations.1 Within each category, the courts’ analytical approaches and
results have varied widely. The current state of the law is unsatisfactory, with
jurisdiction too often depending upon unpredictable guesses at congressional intent
without providing a coherent construction of § 1332 to guide future litigants. While
courts have decided the cases in each of the two categories without reference to the other,
in this Article I propose a solution that synthesizes the two categories and gives the
language “shall be deemed” in § 1332 a consistent construction. In one sense, the
solution that I propose is modest, in that it produces results consistent with the majority
approach under each category. But in another sense it is novel because it is textually
reconcilable, it synthesizes both categories, and it provides the certainty needed in a
jurisdictional inquiry.
A preliminary note about my solution is needed. It is not one of a strict
constructionist, whatever that means. But it is one of a constructionist. The cases in this
area are plagued by a structural flaw. While framing their analyses in terms of “clear” or
“ambiguous” text, the courts have actually imposed no construction at all, instead
jumping to the what-did-Congress intend answer, which when divorced from the text
translates into what the judge thinks Congress should have done.2 But even spotting an

1

In this Article, I use the term “international corporations” to refer to a corporation that has either—but not
both—a foreign incorporation or a foreign principal place of business. No problem exists if the corporation
is purely foreign or purely domestic. See infra page 13-14.
2
“When you are told to decide, not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on the basis of what it
meant, and are assured there is no necessary connection between the two, your best shot at figuring out
what the legislature meant is to ask yourself what a wise and intelligent person should have mean and that

3

ambiguity is not a license to choose the most desirable result. Rather, spotting an
ambiguity is only a license to choose between permissible constructions of the words.
The end goal should be to give the statute a meaning that resolves the instant case and
applies consistently in future cases, not to merely choose the winner in each case.
Consistency and predictability are especially important in jurisdictional inquiries, where
the lack of either results in prolonged litigation about where to litigate.
To determine jurisdiction in cases involving international corporations and
permanent resident aliens, courts must construe two “deeming provisions” in 28 U.S.C. §
1332, which I will refer to as the corporate deeming provision3 and the permanent
resident deeming provision,4 respectively. As explained in Part I-B, determining
jurisdiction under § 1332 is a two-step process: a court must first classify the citizenship
of the parties and second determine whether the party lineup as classified satisfies any of
the jurisdiction-granting subcategories of § 1332(a). The deeming provisions impact the
first step, classifying citizenship.
The corporate deeming provision and the permanent-resident deeming provision
use the same “deeming” language, which is emphasized below. The corporate deeming
provision provides that a “corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by
which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business.”5 The permanent-resident deeming provision provides that an “alien admitted
to the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in

will surely bring you to the conclusion that the law means what you think it ought to mean.” Antonin
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, at 18 (Princeton 1997).
3
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
4
Id. § 1332(a).
5
Id.
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which such alien is domiciled.”6 The “shall be deemed” phrasebecomes important later ,
both in anchoring a cohesive, textually defensible, synthesized result and in
demonstrating how the courts have been skipping a step.
Both deeming provisions were added by congressional amendments and
unquestionably remove from federal jurisdiction some cases that were within it before the
amendments. The disputes in this area have centered on whether, while removing some
cases from §1332, the deeming provisions also create jurisdiction in some cases where
jurisdiction did not exist before the amendments added the deeming provisions. What
becomes apparent later is that resolving the does-it-expand-jurisdiction question requires
that we insert a word into the deeming provisions. My solution resolves the missingword problem consistently in both provisions. At the risk of providing too much
information too soon and before the needed context, the next paragraph previews the
missing-word problem and my solution.
Under my solution, the words “shall be deemed” perform a simple function in the
deeming provisions. They confer State citizenship (that’s capital-S State, meaning a
United States State)7 on litigants. But they do not strip litigants of preexisting alien
status. If an alien was an alien before the deeming provision was passed, she retains her
alien status. So, the deeming provisions deem a litigant [also] a State citizen, rather than
[only] a State citizen. When construed this way, neither of the deeming provisions create
jurisdiction where it did not exist before the amendments. The historical context suggests
that Congress enacted the deeming provision to remove essentially local disputes from §
1332. Under my approach, that’s all the provisions do. Two other benefits follow. First,
6

Id. § 1332(a).
The reference to capital-S States also includes United States Territories, the District of Columbia, and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
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my solution avoids the constitutional problems created by construing the deeming
provisions to strip a litigant of alien status. And second, my solution gives effect to
differing language in the other deeming provision in § 1332, which expressly provides
that certain litigants are deemed “only” citizens of certain States.
To be sure, one might conjure up certain scenarios where my solution would
eliminate jurisdiction but where, in the view of the conjurer, exercising jurisdiction would
better serve the purposes of alienage jurisdiction. But it is not an acceptable method of
statutory construction to conclude: when no construction yields the construer’s desired
result in every case, the statute need be given no construction.
The Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I will outline the structure of
subject-matter jurisdiction generally and the statutory grant of jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. §
1332 specifically.8 This preliminary material, while elementary in a traditional diversity
case, presents subtleties that must be mastered to understand the problems that have
arisen in the two categories. In Part II, I will outline the issues surrounding both deeming
provisions and how courts have resolved recurring litigation patterns.9 In Part III, I will
propose my solution and demonstrate how it operates consistently in both categories, how
it solves the problems raised in Part II, and how it applies in common scenarios.10
Finally, at the end of the Article, a chart appears.11 The chart contains: (1) the common
scenarios presented under both deeming provisions; (2) whether jurisdiction existed in
each scenario before the relevant deeming provision; (3) whether jurisdiction exists under
my solution; and (4) whether jurisdiction might exist under any feasible alternative

8

See Infra, Part I, p.
See Infra, Part II, p.
10
See Infra, Part II, p.
11
See Infra, p.
9
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solutions. While I aim this Article at the current interpretative task facing the courts, in
the margins I will also reference and compare proposed legislation, which is in its early
stages.12
I. Basic Structure of subject-matter jurisdiction and § 1332
The cases involving international corporations and permanent-resident aliens
present questions both of statutory construction and constitutional boundaries. These
questions often overlap, as the potential unconstitutional results influence statutory
construction. This Part provides the structural background needed to understand the
issues described in Part II. In Part I-A, I will outline the basic nature of the subjectmatter jurisdiction inquiry and Article III of the Constitution’s role in that inquiry. In
Part I-B, I will detail 28 U.S.C. § 1332’s structure, emphasizing alienage jurisdiction.
A. Article III’s role in the subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry.
Article III, § 2 provides that the judicial power “shall extend” to certain categories
of cases or controversies, known as the heads of jurisdiction.13 Despite the “shall extend”
language, Article III is not a self-executing grant of jurisdiction to the lower federal
courts.14 That is, Article III confers no jurisdiction on the federal district courts.15 To

12

See H.R. 5440. HR 5440, entitled “A Bill to amend title 28, United States Code, to clarify the
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, and for other purposes,” was approved by the Subcommittee on Courts,
the Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee on May 22, 2006.
13
“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; --to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; --to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction; --to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party’ –to Controversies between two
or more States; --between a State and Citizens of another State [modified by the 11th Amendment]; -between Citizens of different States; --between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2.
14
Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245
(1845).
15
Id.; John T. Parry, No Appeal: The U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty’s Effort to Create
Federal Jurisdiction, 25 LOYOLA L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 543, 561 (Summer 2003). In contrast,
Article III’s grants of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court are self-executing. Lawrence Gene Sager,
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have subject-matter jurisdiction, the federal district courts need congressional
authorization.16 What purpose, then, do the heads of jurisdiction serve in Article III, § 2?
The heads of jurisdiction define the limits on Congress’spower to confer jurisdiction on
the federal courts.17 In other words, Article III, § 2 defines the maximum reach of the
federal judicial power—it sets the limits on what jurisdiction Congress can give its
courts.18 When Congress confers jurisdiction on the federal courts, it must be able to
point to one of the heads of jurisdiction within the Constitution as authorizing that
particular grant. Thus, determining subject-matter jurisdiction is a two-step process.
First, did Congress confer jurisdiction? And second, if so, did Article III, § 2 give
Congress the power to do so?
In most modern litigation, the focus is on the first step—determining whether
Congress conferred jurisdiction. This focus is appropriate because, in most cases,
jurisdiction depends upon statutes that the Supreme Court has construed more narrowly
than the boundaries of Article III. For example, in federal-question cases, the focus is
almost always on the scope of the statutory grant, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because the court
has construed § 1331’s jurisdictional grant much more narrowly than the corresponding

Constitutional Limitations on Congress’s Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95
HARV. L. REV. 17, 23-24 (1981).
16
Cary, 44 U.S. at 245 (“[T]he judicial power of the United States, although it has its origins in the
Constitution, is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this court) dependent for its
distribution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who
possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court), for the exercise of the
judicial power, and of investing them with jurisdiction either limited or concurrent, or exclusive, and of
withholding jurisdiction for them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper
for the public good.”).
17
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850) (“The Constitution has defined the limits of the judicial power
of the United States, but has not prescribed how much of it shall be exercised” by the lower federal courts.);
see Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 491 (1983).
18
Rory Ryan, No Welcome Mat, No Problem?: Federal-Question Jurisdiction After Grable, __ ST. JOHN’S
LAW REVIEW ___ (2006).
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head of jurisdiction.19 Similarly, in a pure diversity case (one involving no alien parties),
courts have no need to check constitutional boundaries because, as detailed in the next
part, the Court has construed the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction more narrowly
than the corresponding head of jurisdiction that authorizes Congress to confer jurisdiction
in cases “between Citizens of different States.”20
Alienage cases (particularly those involving permanent-resident aliens) can raise
issues at both steps. Cases involving international corporations and permanent-resident
aliens present difficult questions of § 1332’s proper construction. But unlike the plain
vanilla federal-question and diversity cases mentioned last paragraph, the alienage cases
also present constitutional questions. Article III authorizes Congress to confer
jurisdiction in cases between citizens of different States and in cases between citizens of a
State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state (aliens).21 But Article III does not
authorize Congress to confer jurisdiction in cases solely between aliens.22 Certain
expansive constructions of the deeming provisions raise questions about the precise
boundaries of Congress’s Article III power and about exactly what constitutes a

19

For example, the well-pleaded-complaint rule eliminates some cases from district-court jurisdiction
under § 1331, Louisville & Nashville RR Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) though the presence of a
federal defense makes a case “arise under” federal law for Article III purposes, Louisville & Nashville RR
Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911) and Congress can override the rule. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121,
136-137 (1989) (The federal officer removal statute “merely serves to overcome the well-pleaded
complaint rule which would otherwise preclude removal even if a federal defense were alleged.”).
20
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967) (The complete-diversity rule arises
from the language of § 1332, not from the Constitution. “Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative
extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not cocitizens.”)
21
U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2.
22
Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 3 L.Ed. 108 (1809), see also Kramer v. Caribbean Mills,
Inc., 394 U.S. 823, 825 n. 2 (1969) (federal court may not exercise jurisdiction over case solely between
two alien corporations); Jackson v. Twentyman, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 136, 136 (1829) (noting that, under the
Constitution, “the judicial power was not extended to private suits, in which an alien is a party, unless a
citizen be the adverse party”); Montalet v. Murray, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 46, 47 (1807) (“The Court was
unanimously of opinion that the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction of cases between aliens.”).
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forbidden suit between aliens.23 Because of the potential constitutional problems, the two
steps commingle—under accepted principles of statutory construction, the potential
unconstitutionality influences the construction of the statutory language.
Having presented the basic constitutional structure, I will leave the details of the
constitutional questions until Parts II and III. Next, I turn to the statutory grant of
diversity and alienage jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

B. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and the deeming provisions
28 U.S.C. § 1332 provides, in relevant part:
(a)The district courts shall have original jurisdiction over all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interests and costs, and is between:
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; and
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a
foreign state are additional parties.
***
For the purposes of this section . . . and section 1441 an alien admitted to the
United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in
which such alien is domiciled.
***
(c) For purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title—
(1) a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it
has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business . . . .
(2) the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be deemed to
be a citizen only of the same State as the decedent, and the legal

23

See generally In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 247 F. Supp.2d 1071, 1073 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (noting the
potential collision course between certain constructions of the permanent-resident deeming provision and
Article III).
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representative of an infant or incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen
only of the same State as the infant or incompetent.

Assuming the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied, jurisdictional
inquiries under § 1332 have two steps. First, the court must classify the citizenship of all
the parties. Section 1332 contains several provisions governing how to classify a party’s
citizenship.24 But not all citizenship questions are answered by § 1332, and the
citizenship classification therefore often requires resort to judicially created principles.25
Second, having classified the parties’ citizenships, the court must examine whether the
party lineup fits one of the subsections of § 1332(a). The subsections of § 1332(a) are the
congressional grants of jurisdiction. For logistical reasons, I will discuss the steps in
reverse order, starting with the subsections.
(1) The subsections
Subsections § 1332(a)(1)-(a)(3)26 grant jurisdiction in three different categories of
cases and contain subtleties that are lost in a common generalization regarding § 1332. It
is often generalized (imprecisely) that § 1332 requires “complete diversity” of citizenship
and that all aliens are treated as citizens of the same foreign state.27 So (following the
generalization) if the case involves litigants on both sides who either share citizenship in
a State or who are both aliens, jurisdiction is improper. This generalization will, in some

24

E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 (a), (c) & (d).
For example, the definition of an individual’s citizenship has been left to judicial development, Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3611 at 507, as has the definition of what constitutes a
corporation’s principal place of business. E.g., Teal Energy USA, Inc. v. GT, Inc., 369 F.3d 873 (5th Cir.
2004).
26
Subsection(a)(4) is outside the scope of this article. It authorizes jurisdiction when the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000 and the civil action is “between a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of
a State or of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(4).
27
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Systems, Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing
underlying statutory framework).
25
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situations, produce incorrect results, as demonstrated below. A proper analysis views
each subsection as an independent grant of jurisdiction.28
Subsection (a)(1) is the grant of pure diversity jurisdiction.29 It grants jurisdiction
in cases “between citizens of different States.”30 The Court has consistently construed
this quoted statutory phrase to require complete diversity of citizenship, meaning that no
litigant on one side of a case can share State citizenship with any litigant on the other side
of the case.31 Co-parties, but not adverse parties, can share State citizenship.
Importantly, subsection (a)(1) does not apply when the case involves any litigant who is
an alien. Subsection (a)(1) authorizes jurisdiction in cases involving only State—that’s
State with a capital “S”, as in the United States32—citizens. If an alien litigant is present
in the suit, jurisdiction must be found under (a)(2) or (a)(3).
Subsection (a)(2) is the congressional grant of pure alienage jurisdiction.33 Pure
alienage jurisdiction exists when all litigants on one side are State citizens and all
litigants on the other side are aliens.34 It does not authorize jurisdiction between State
citizens. If State citizens are present on both sides, jurisdiction depends upon either
(a)(1) or (a)(3). Nor does (a)(2) authorize jurisdiction when aliens are present on both
sides.35 If a case involves aliens on both sides, jurisdiction can only be proper under
(a)(3).

28

See id. (noting that the proper inquiry is whether the party alignment satisfies one of § 1332(a)’s
pigeonholes).
29
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
30
Id.
31
Owen Equipment v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978).
32
See note 7, supra.
33
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
34
See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989); Allendale Mut. Ins. Co.v. Bull
Data Systems, Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1993).
35
See Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Systems, Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting
jurisdiction when the suit involved an alien versus an alien and citizen).
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Subsection (a)(3) is the grant of diversity-alienage hybrid jurisdiction. This
subsection grants jurisdiction when the case would satisfy diversity jurisdiction among
State citizens but also involves aliens.36 To trigger (a)(3), State citizens must be present
on both sides of the case, and complete diversity must exist among those State citizens.37
This trigger is needed because (a)(3) uses the same language as (a)(1), “citizens of
different States.”38 Under subsection (a)(3), provided the trigger is present (completely
diverse State citizens on both sides), jurisdiction is proper even if aliens are additional
parties.39 It is in this situation that the above-mentioned generalization fails. Under the
plain language of (a)(3), the presence of aliens on both sides of the case does not destroy
jurisdiction.40 For example, suppose the suit involves two plaintiffs—one a Citizen of
State X and one nonresident alien—versus two defendants—one a citizen of State Y and
one nonresident alien. Applying (a)(3), jurisdiction would be proper because the suit
contains completely diverse State citizens on both sides, and aliens are additional
parties.41 Conversely, suppose the suit involves a Citizen of State X and a nonresident
alien as plaintiffs and only a nonresident alien as defendant. Now, jurisdiction is
improper, but not because the presence of aliens on both sides is always fatal, but rather

36

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3).
See Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 828 (1989).
38
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), (3).
39
Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 106 F.3d 494, 497-500 (3d Cir. 1997).
40
Id.; Goar v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 688 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1982); see Israel Aircraft Indus.
Ltd v. Sanwa Bus Credit Corp., 16 F.3d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1994); Karaznos v. Madison Two Assocs., 147
F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1998). See also Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1952); Nancy
M. Berkley, Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Suits Between Diverse United States Citizens With Aliens
Joined to Both Sides of the Controversy Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3), 38 RUTGERS L.REV. 71, 94 (1985)
(noting that the purpose of § 1332(a)(3) was to provide a federal forum for diverse United States citizens
irrespective of their involvement with alien parties).
41
See cases cited, supra, note 40.
37
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because now this case simply doesn’t trigger subsection (a)(3), which is the only
subsection that allows aliens to be on both sides.42
Several rules emerge from synthesizing these subsections. First, jurisdiction is
never proper under § 1332 when citizens of the same State are present on both sides of a
suit. Both (a)(1) and (a)(3) require complete diversity, and (a)(2) applies only to pure
alienage situations. Second, jurisdiction is never proper in a suit only between aliens. No
subsection authorizes such a suit, and for good reason—the Constitution does not
authorize Congress to grant jurisdiction in a suit only between aliens. 43 Third, when
aliens are present on both sides of the case, jurisdiction is only proper when completely
diverse State citizens appear on both sides of the dispute, triggering § 1332(a)(3).44
The discussion thus far has assumed the citizenship of the parties. The next
subpart works backwards to detail how the court classifies the citizenship of various
parties.
(2) Classifying citizenship
Before a court can evaluate whether a case fits one of the § 1332(a) subsections, it
must classify the citizenship of each party. Because of this Article’s scope, I will focus
only upon classifying the citizenship of corporations and individuals, beginning with the
law before the deeming provisions and then focusing specifically upon the deeming
provisions and how they impact the citizenship classification in cases involving
permanent-resident aliens and international corporations.

42

Karaznos, 147 F.3d at 627.
See cases cited, note 22, supra.
44
E.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148, 1151 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985) (Section “1332(a)(3) is
inapplicable in this case because United States citizens are not on both sides of the controversy.”).
43
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Corporations. Before Congress added the corporate deeming provision in 1958,
all corporations were citizens only of their places of incorporation.45 So, a corporation
incorporated in a State was only a citizen of that State, while a corporation incorporated
abroad was an alien for § 1332 purposes.46 After classifying citizenship in the place of
incorporation, courts could easily apply the § 1332(a) subcategories.
In 1958, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by adding the corporate deeming
provision.47 The corporate deeming provision provides:
“A corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been
incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.48
Historical context and legislative history reveal that Congress added the corporate
deeming provision to remove a certain category of cases from federal jurisdiction.49
Because of the long-standing pre-1958 rule that a corporation was only a citizen of its
place of incorporation, diversity existed in cases where it was not needed to avoid local
bias.50 For example, suppose a corporation is headquartered in State X and conducts
essentially all of its operations in State X, but for practical reasons is incorporated in
State Y. Before 1958, though the corporation was essentially at home in State X and
could not fear local bias in State X, diversity jurisdiction would have existed over a suit

45
See Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 3624 (discussing pre-1958 law) & 3626 (discussing the unusual
circumstance of a corporation incorporated under multiple states’ laws).
46
Steampship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 121 (1882) (A “corporation of a foreign State is, for purposes
of jurisdiction in the courts of the United States, to be deemed, constructively, a citizen or subject of such
State.”); Lewis v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 465, 470 (D.C. La. 1952).
47
Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415 (1958
48
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).
49
See generally, Hearing before the Subcommittee on courts, the internet and intellectural property, No.
109-67 (November 15, 2005), at 4 (Testimony of the Hon. Janet C. Hall).
50
See Jerguson v. Blue Dot Investment, 659 F.2d 31, 33 (1981) (“‘The underlying purpose of diversity of
citizenship legislation … is to provide a separate forum for out-of-State citizens against the prejudices of
local courts and local juries by making available to them the benefits and safeguards of the Federal Courts.
Whatever the effectiveness of this rule, it was never intended to extend to local corporations which ,
because of a legal fiction, are considered citizens of another State.’”) (citing S.Rep. No. 1830 Cong. 2d
Sess., reprinted in (1958) U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3099, 3101-02.).
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between the corporation and another State X citizen. By deeming the corporation as
State X citizen, “Congress intended to limit the diversity jurisdiction . . . to those out-ofstate citizens who should be free of local bias.”51
The corporate deeming provision creates no complexities when corporate parties
are either purely domestic or purely foreign. When a corporation is purely domestic,
meaning it has both a domestic incorporation and domestic principal place of business,
the corporate deeming provision deems the corporation a citizen of the State (or States)
where it is incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business. For
example, a corporation incorporated in Delaware with a principal place of business in
Texas is a dual citizen of Delaware and Texas, and thus jurisdiction would fail if any
litigant on the other side were a Delaware or Texas citizen.52 Similarly, purely foreign
corporations, meaning corporations that have both a foreign incorporation and principal
place of business, are simply aliens.
But that capital-S term “State” has created problems in cases involving
international corporations.53 Does the corporate deeming provision apply to foreign
corporations? If so, does a foreign corporation with a domestic principal place of business
have dual citizenship as both an alien and State citizen? What about a domestically
incorporated corporation with a principal place of business abroad? Does the corporate
deeming provision, while removing jurisdiction in some cases, actually create jurisdiction
that did not exist before the corporate deeming provision? Part II explores these problems
and surveys the relevant case law. Part III presents my solutions.

51

Id.
Supra, text p. 14 (Note to editors: this supra note will appear frequently. It targets my paragraph
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Individuals. Individuals generally fit within one of four categories: (1) United
States citizens domiciled in a State; (2) United States citizens domiciled abroad; (3)
nonresident aliens; and (4) permanent-resident aliens.54 A United States citizen
domiciled in a State is a citizen of that State for diversity purposes.55 A United States
citizen domiciled abroad is a citizen of nowhere, and that citizen’s presence in the lawsuit
destroys jurisdiction under § 1332 regardless of the citizenship of the remaining parties.56
Nonresident aliens (meaning a citizen or subject of a foreign state not admitted to the
United States for permanent residence) are aliens. 57 When a lawsuit involves only
parties in these first three categories, the § 1332(a) subsections can be neatly evaluated
under the framework provided in the previous subpart.
Permanent-resident aliens present more complex problems because of the 1988
amendment adding the permanent-resident deeming provision. Before 1988, for
jurisdictional purposes, an alien was an alien. That is, if a litigant was a “citizen or
subject of a foreign state,” the litigant was an alien. Neither the alien’s domicile nor
status as a permanent resident affected the alien’s citizenship.58 In 1988, Congress added
the permanent-resident deeming provision, which provides: “[A]n alien admitted to the
United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which

54

Two additional categories, though less common, exist. First, the unusual problem of dual nationals is
addressed later in Part III-B-2. And second, a person may be a “homeless wanderer” with no nationality,
thus making her a citizen of nowhere, akin to the United States citizen domiciled abroad. See Blair
Holdings Corp. v. Rubenstein, 133 F. Supp. 496, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
55
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989); Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399
(5th Cir. 1974).
56
Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 68 (2d. Cir. 1990).
57
“A person is considered a citizen or subject of a foreign nation if he or she is accorded that status by the
laws or government of that country.” Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3611 at 508-09.
58
C.H. Nichols Lumber Co. v. Franson, 203 U.S. 278, 283 (1906); Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1183
(7th Cir. 1980).
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such alien is domiciled.”59 What impact does this provision have on classifying a
permanent-resident alien’s citizenship?
The permanent-resident deeming provision creates no complexities in the class of
cases in which it was apparently intended to apply. Like the purpose of the corporate
deeming provision, the purpose of the permanent-resident deeming provision was to
carve out a narrow category of essentially local disputes. Because of the pre-1988 analien-is-an-alien rule, jurisdiction existed under § 1332 where it was not needed to avoid
local bias. For example, suppose a permanent-resident alien is domiciled in State X.
Before 1988, though the permanent-resident alien was at home in State X and could not
fear local bias there, jurisdiction would have existed over a suit between a United States
citizen domiciled in State X and the permanent-resident alien. Congress added the
deeming provision because it saw “no apparent reason why actions between persons who
are permanent residents of the same State should be heard by Federal courts merely
because one of them remains a citizen or subject of a foreign state.”60 All courts agree
that the deeming provision removes jurisdiction over this category of cases, in which a
permanent-resident alien domiciled in a State sues a citizen of the same State.
But Congress apparently never considered what effect the permanent-resident
deeming provision would have on a case involving a permanent-resident alien on one
side and an alien on the other. Does the permanent-resident deeming provision, while
removing some disputes from § 1332, actually create jurisdiction in some cases where
jurisdiction did not exist before 1988? Part II explores these problems and surveys the
relevant case law. Part III presents my solutions.

59
60

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing 131 Cong. rec. at 31, 054 (1988)).
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II. Detailing the struggle
As demonstrated earlier, the deeming provisions govern the citizenship
classification of international corporations and permanent-resident aliens.

In some cases,

the deeming provisions interact uncontroversially with the § 1332(a) subcategories to
remove jurisdiction that would have existed before the deeming provisions. The cases
that have troubled the courts, though, involve a different situation—one party argues that
the deeming provisions interact with the subsections to create jurisdiction where
jurisdiction would not have existed before the deeming provisions. In the two subparts
below, I will explore the struggles involved with the two deeming provisions. In part III,
I will propose a solution that synthesizes the two provisions, highlight the lurking
missing-word problem, and return to apply my solution to the categories formed in part
II. The chart that follows the Article tracks this structure.
A. International Corporations
The corporate deeming provision provides: “ a corporation shall be deemed a
citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its
principal place of business.”61 Two types of international corporations exist. First, a
foreign corporation (meaning a corporation incorporated by a foreign state) may have its
principal place of business62 in a State. And second, a domestic corporation may have a
foreign principal place of business.

61

28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). The proposed amendment mentioned in note 12, HR 5440, would fix the
ambiguities in this area by expressly deeming corporations citizens of foreign states: “a corporation shall
be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the
State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.” § 3(1).
62
A corporation can have only one principal place of business. It is now settled that the inquiry seeks the
corporation’s worldwide principal place of business. Arab In’tl Bank & Trust Co. v. National Westminister
Bank Ltd., 463 F.Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Richmond Const. Corp. v. Hilb, 482 F.Supp. 1201, 1205
(D.C. Florida 1980); and David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 223 F.Supp. 273, 289 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
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(1) Foreign Corporation with domestic principal place of business.
Two underlying questions exist. First, does the corporate deeming provision
apply at all to foreign corporations? And second, if it does apply, does it create dual
citizenship for a foreign corporation with a domestic principal place of business?
The first question, despite initial mixed results, has been settled—the corporate
deeming provision does apply to foreign corporations. In Eisenberg, the first court to
address the question determined that the corporate deeming provision did not apply to
foreign corporations at all.63 Following reasoning that has been overwhelmingly
rejected,64 the court concluded that, even if a foreign corporation has a principal place of
business in a State, it is not a citizen of that State, and is instead only an alien because,
while the corporate deeming provision deems the corporation a citizen of the State where
it has its principal place of business, the corporate deeming provision does not apply to
foreign corporations.65
I accept as settled the nearly uniform rejection of Eisenberg and evaluate the
second question, on which a dispute exists. The question is not whether the corporate
deeming provision applies to foreign corporations. Instead, the question is how it applies.
With Eisenberg out of the picture, two potential solutions apply to classifying the

1963); R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Ben Kozloff, Inc., 507 F.Supp. 614 (N.D.Ill., 1981); Lee v. Trans American
Trucking Service, Inc., 111 F.Supp.2d 135 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). A few early courts and commentators
suggested that the court should seek out the corporation’s principal place of business within the United
States, Simon Holding PLC Group of Cos. U.K., v. Klenz, 878 F.Supp. 210 (M.D. Fla. 1995) but this
approach has been correctly rejected. To illustrate, suppose a corporation was incorporated in Mexico, and
had 99.9% of its operations in Mexico, but had a single United States “place of business,”, one-person
office in Texas. If the inquiry sought the corporations principal place of business within the United States,
the corporation would be deemed a Texas citizen. See also, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3628.
63
Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 189 F.Supp. 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
64
E.g., Rouhi v. Harza Engineering Co., 785 F.Supp. 1290, 1293 (N.D.Ill. 1992); Torres v. Southern Peru
Copper Corp., 965 F.Supp. 895, 897 (S.D.Tex. 1995) ; Danjaq, S.A. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 979
F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1992); Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1558+ (11th Cir. 1989).
See also, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3628.
65
Eisenberg, 189 F. Supp. at 502.
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citizenship of a foreign corporation with a principal place of business in State X: (1) the
foreign corporation could be classified as only a citizen of State X; or (2) the foreign
corporation could be classified as a dual citizen, as a citizen of State X and an alien.
Both of these solutions treat, as they must, a corporation as a citizen of the State where it
has its principal place of business—the plain language of § 1332(c) and its capital-S State
demand it. The underlying question is whether the corporation retains its alien status or
whether the deeming provision strips the corporation of its preexisting alien status. With
this context in mind, I explore the decisions in the context of common party alignments to
examine the different constructions of the deeming provisions and the results generated
by combining those constructions with the § 1332(a) subcategories.
Foreign corporation with principal place of business in State X v. United States
Citizen domiciled in State X. Under both of the two potential solutions mentioned above,
jurisdiction fails. Whether the foreign corporation is only a citizen of State X or is both a
citizen of State X and an alien, citizens of State X still appear on both sides, and the case
therefore fits none of the § 1332(a) subcategories.66 Accordingly, once they have
rejected Eisenberg, courts have unanimously held jurisdiction improper in this scenario.67
Notably, before 1958, jurisdiction would have been proper in this scenario, but now it’s
not.
Foreign Corporation with principal place of business in State X v. nonresident
alien. In this scenario, the answer depends upon which of the two potential solutions a
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Danjaq v. Pathe 979 F.2d 772, 773 (9th Cir. 1992); Petroleum & Energy Intelligence 762 F.Supp. 530,
532 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Lee v. Trans American Trucking Serv. Inc. 111 F.Supp.2d 135, 139 (E.D.N.Y.
1999); Southeast Guaranty Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc. 358 F.Supp. 1001, 1005-1006 (N.D. Ill.
1973); Vareka v. American Investment Properties 724 F.2d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 1984).
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court has chosen. Most courts have chosen the second solution, treating the corporation
as both an alien and a Citizen of State X.68 Under this approach, jurisdiction fails
because aliens appear on both sides and the alignmentdoes not satisfy § 1332(a)(3).69
For example, in Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon, alien plaintiffs sued Esso Tankers, a foreign
corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey.70 The Fifth Circuit held
that Esso Tankers, “though a citizen of New Jersey, is to be regarded as a citizen of
Liberia as well.”71 Because aliens appeared on both sides and the alignment did not
satisfy § 1332(a)(3), jurisdiction failed.72
A few courts have chosen the first solution, treating the corporation only as a
citizen of State X. Under this approach, jurisdiction would be proper under § 1332(a)(2)
because it would be a suit between a State citizen and an alien.73 One example, Trans
World Hospital Supplies Limited v. Hospital Corporation of America, 74 through its
omission of a step helps to illustrate the interaction of the corporate deeming provision
and the subsections. There, an alien sued the defendant corporation, which was
incorporated abroad and had its principal place of business in Tennessee.75 After rejecting
Eisenberg and concluding that the corporate deeming provision does apply to foreign
corporations, the court held that “Despite its incorporation in a foreign country, if an alien
corporation maintains a principal place of business in a State in the United States, no
68

Danjaq v. Pathe Communications Corp., 979 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1992); Petroleum & Energy Intelligence
v. Liscom, 762 F.Supp 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Southeast Guaranty Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc.,
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(11th Cir. 1984).
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Supra, text p. 14 (Note to editors: this supra note will appear frequently. It targets my paragraph
beginning “Several rules emerge,” which at submission appeared on page 14).
70
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Id.
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28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
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542 F. Supp. 869, 870 (MD Tenn 1982).
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Id.
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compelling reason exists that it should not be deemed a citizen of that State.”76 Thus, the
court found jurisdiction proper under § 1332(a)(2). The TransWorld court skipped a
vital step. No plausible post-Eisenberg dispute exists about whether the alien corporation
was a Tennessee citizen—the plain text of the corporate deeming provision demands it.
The skipped step was determining whether the corporation was only a Tennessee citizen
or whether the corporation was both an alien and a Tennessee citizen. A familiar analogy
is helpful. Suppose our plaintiff is a Texas citizen. Our defendant is incorporated in
Texas and has its principal place of business in Nebraska. Under Transworld, the inquiry
would seemingly stop once we determine that “no compelling reason exists” not to deem
the defendant a Nebraska citizen. But of course jurisdiction fails because the defendant is
also a Texas citizen.
While the TransWorld approach is flawed, it does, through its omission, help
highlight the proper path. Returning to our hypothetical, our plaintiff is an alien. Before
1958, jurisdiction would have been improper because this would have been a forbidden
suit between aliens, the corporation being an alien because of its foreign incorporation.
We know now that the corporate deeming provision deems the defendant a State-X
citizen. The precise issue is whether: (1) the corporate deeming provision strips the
corporation’s preexisting alien status, makes the corporation only a citizen of State X, and
therefore expands jurisdiction; or (2) whether the deeming provision adds State-X
citizenship to the corporation, but does not strip alienage status and therefore does not
expand jurisdiction.
(2) Domestic corporation with foreign principal place of business.

76

Id. at 878.
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This situation has arisen infrequently, but deserves mention. Suppose our
plaintiff is incorporated in State X and has its principal place of business abroad. Again,
two potential solutions exist: (1) the corporation could be classified as only a citizen of
State X; or (2) the corporation could be classified as both an alien and State X citizen.77
The courts that have directly addressed this issue have correctly concluded that a
domestic corporation with its principal place of business abroad has only a single
citizenship in its State of incorporation.78 Under this approach, jurisdiction does not exist
when the corporation sues a State X citizen, but does exist when the corporation sues an
alien. Both of these results are the same as they would have been before 1958. I explore
this scenario further in Part III.
B. Permanent-Resident Aliens
As does the corporate deeming provision, the permanent-resident deeming
provision applies uncontroversially to remove certain essentially local disputes from §
1332. The problems have arisen when alien litigants are present on the side opposite the
permanent-resident alien. In this situation, some courts have construed the permanentresident deeming provision to create jurisdiction where it would not have existed before
1958.79 For context, I will first briefly revisit the uncontroversial application. Then I will
examine the split in authority in the controversial cases. As before, two potential
77

No plausible argument exists that the corporation is only an alien.
Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation, 113 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 1997); Cabalceta v. Standard
Fruit Company, 883 F.2d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1989); Lebanese American Univeristy v. National
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solutions exist to classifying the citizenship of a permanent-resident alien domiciled in
State X: (1) the permanent-resident alien could be classified as only a State X citizen; or
(2) the permanent-resident alien could be classified as a dual citizen, as a citizen of State
X and an alien.
Permanent-resident alien domiciled in State X v. United States Citizen domiciled
in State X. This is the uncontroversial situation, and indeed is the situation Congress
targeted with the permanent-resident deeming provision. Under both of the potential
solutions mentioned above, jurisdiction fails. Even if the permanent-resident alien is only
a citizen of State X, State X citizens still appear on both sides, and the case therefore fits
none of the § 1332(a) categories.80 Courts have uniformly concluded that jurisdiction
fails in this scenario.81 Notably, pure alienage jurisdiction would have existed before
1988 because the permanent-resident alien was an alien.82
Permanent-resident alien domiciled in State X v. Nonresident Alien. In this
scenario, the answer depends upon which of the potential solutions the court chooses.
Most courts have concluded that jurisdiction fails, at least implicitly choosing the second
option and treating the permanent-resident alien as both an alien and a citizen of State
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X.83 Under this approach, jurisdiction fails because aliens appear on both sides, unless
the alignment satisfies § 1332(a)(3). A few courts have chosen the first solution,
impliedly treating the permanent-resident alien as only a citizen of State X.84 Under this
approach, pure alienage jurisdiction exists because a suit exists between an alien (the
nonresident alien) and a State citizen (the permanent-resident alien). Notably, before the
deeming provision, jurisdiction would not have existed in this scenario because an alien
was an alien.
The decisions in this area are troubling—even those that reach the correct result.
The prevailing template has been to conclude that the permanent-resident deeming
provision’s “clear” and “unambiguous” text favors finding jurisdiction and then to
evaluate whether extratextual reasons justify departing from the clear text. Some courts
have concluded that they are bound by the clear text, though they don’t evaluate the text
in any detail, instead generalizing broadly about how the neglected text comports with
congressional intent. Other courts, uncritically conceding textual clarity, nonetheless
depart from it because of the compelling extratextual reasons. After setting forth the two
diverging circuit decisions below, I will demonstrate in Part III that the template is
wrong. Neither answer is textually preferable. Here again, we encounter the missingword problem. The extratextual reasons are not extratextual at all; rather they are
contextual factors to examine when construing an ambiguous text.
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(D. Colo. 1998); Engstrom v. Hornseth 959 F.Supp. 545, 553 (D. Puerto Rico 1997); and Lloyds Bank v.
Norkin, 817 F.Supp 414, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
84
See Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG, 9 F.3d 303, 312 (3d. Cir. 1993); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 247
F.Supp.2d 1071, 1076 (S.D. Indiana 2003) and Song v. Kim 1993 WL 526340 at *4 (D.N.J. 1993)
(Unreported Decision).

26

The Third Circuit in Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG held that jurisdiction was proper
when a permanent resident alien domiciled in Virginia sued two defendants: a German
corporation and a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New
Jersey.85 The court held that the plain meaning of § 1332(a) clearly deemed the
permanent resident alien a citizen of Virginia—and apparently only a citizen of Virginia.
Therefore, this was a case between citizens of different States in which an alien was an
additional party.
Although finding the answer textually compelled, the Singh court continued to
examine the provision’slegislative history and concluded that the 1988 amendments
were intended only to make “modest adjustments to the scope of diversity jurisdiction.”86
Importantly, the court recognized the potential unconstitutional application of the
permanent-resident deeming provision when a permanent-resident alien sues another
alien. The court disregarded these potential problems, however, stating “[t]he alleged
constitutional issue that might arise when one alien sues another is not presented in this
case because there is a citizen party, thereby satisfying minimal diversity.”87 Thus, the
Court refused to apply the canon of constitutional avoidance because applying the statute
to these parties would not be unconstitutional even if the court’s construction of the
statute might lead to unconstitutional results with other parties.
Other courts have disagreed with Singh and refused jurisdiction when an alien
was adverse to the permanent-resident alien. Without much analysis, those courts have
followed the template, uncritically assuming that the “textual” answer is the one favoring
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jurisdiction,88 but have departed for extratextual reasons. For example, in the only
similar case to reach the circuit level, the D.C. Circuit held that subject-matter
jurisdiction did not exist when a nonresident alien plaintiff sued a permanent-resident
alien domiciled in Maryland. While the court noted that the literal language of the statute
created jurisdiction, it found that Congress did not “intend” to create jurisdiction in this
situation.89 The court justified looking beyond the language of the statute, and
determined “‘[w]here the literal reading of a statutory term would 'compel an odd result,'
... we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its proper
scope."90
Generally courts thathave gone beyond the text of the statute 91 have done so for
the two reasons mentioned in Singh. First, applying the language “literally” could violate
the Constitution by creating jurisdiction in a suit solely between aliens. Second the
courts have looked at the legislative history and concluded Congress’s intent was to limit
jurisdiction, not to expand it. 92
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As discussed in Part III, the template is wrong. The courts have overlooked the
missing-word problem. They have implicitly read the permanent-resident deeming
provision to “clearly” contain the word “only.” When the clear-text barrier disappears,
the constitutional problems and legislative history can be viewed properly, as contextual
tools used to determine the most reasonable meaning of the phrase “shall be deemed.”
III. A solution.
As noted in the introduction, my solution is modest in that the results it produces
are consistent with the results reached by the majority in each category mentioned in part
II. Thus the approach does not require radical changes, but still produces several
benefits. First, it provides a reasoned, principled approach that provides more guidance
than the what-did-Congress-intend free for all that has infiltrated these areas. Second, it
synthesizes the two provisions, which have thus far been analyzed independently, and
gives the phrase “shall be deemed” a consistent meaning. And third, it avoids the
constitutional problems that arise from other solutions.
The deeming provisions provide:
“[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has
been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.”93
“[A]n alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be
deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.”94

My solution is simple. The key to understanding it is recognizing two things.
First, before Congress added the deeming provisions, law outside of § 1332 created alien
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status for certain litigants. Specifically, though no statute so provided, a corporation
incorporated abroad was historically classified as an alien.95 Also, an individual who was
a citizen or subject of a foreign state was an alien, despite being a domiciliary or
permanent resident of the United States (that is, an alien was an alien). Second, to
resolve the highlighted jurisdictional questions, the court must insert a word after the
statutory phrase “shall be deemed” before the court can examine the subcategories. That
missing word is either “only” or “also.” By passing the deeming provisions, Congress
“deemed” litigants citizens of certain States, thus removing certain categories of cases
from jurisdiction. Had Congress written “shall be deemed [only]”in the relevant deeming
provisions—as it did in § 1332(c)(2) when “deeming” estate representatives citizens of
certain states96--the provisions would operate to not only reduce jurisdiction in some
cases but also to create jurisdiction in others because by deeming a litigant “only” a
citizen of certain States, Congress would be stripping some litigants of alien statuses they
possessed before the deeming provisions were passed.

But the best reading of the

provisions, considering context and consequences, is that Congress meant to confer
additional citizenship on the litigants without stripping preexisting alien status. If
historical reasons outside of § 1332 give a litigant alien status, the deeming provisions
deem the litigant [also] a citizen of certain States. Both constructions (the [only] and
[also] constructions) require inserting an additional word, but the latter is easily superior,
as demonstrated below.
The following subsections (and the summarizing chart) detail my construction in
all of the categories mentioned in Part II.

In Subpart A, I apply my construction to
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J.P. Morgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI), 536 U.S. 88, 98 (2002) (citing Nat. Steam-Ship Co. v.
Tugman, 106 U.S. 118 (1882)).
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international corporations. In Subpart B, I repeat the process for permanent-resident
aliens. Within Subparts A and B, I will first briefly summarize the citizenship
determination. Then, I will detail how the citizenship determination interacts with the
subsections and how my approach comports with the results most courts have reached in
the categories described in Part II. Also, within each, I will consider and respond to
potential counterarguments. In part C, I conclude by examining the results of giving the
words “shall be deemed” a consistent construction in both deeming provisions.
A. International Corporations
(1) Classifying the citizenship of international corporations
Historically, a corporation was considered to be a citizen of its place of
incorporation, whether domestic or foreign.97 If incorporated in a foreign state, a
corporation was an alien. And before the corporate deeming provision, a corporation’s
principal place of business was irrelevant.
Under my construction, the corporate deeming provision: (1) deems the
corporation a citizen of any capital-S State where it is incorporated and (if it has a
domestic principal place of business)98 of the capital-S State where it has its principal
place of business; but (2) does not strip a corporation of any alien status that existed
before the deeming provision. Thus, a foreign corporation with a principal place of
business in State X is both an alien and a Citizen of State X because the corporate
deeming provision deems the corporation a Citizen of State X, but does not deem it
“only” a Citizen of State X. The deeming provision does not divest the corporation of its
preexisting alien status. Conversely, a corporation incorporated in State A with a
97
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principal place of business abroad has only single citizenship. The deeming provision
“deems” the corporation a Citizen of State A, but now there is no historical reason to treat
the corporation as an alien and the corporate deeming provision does not deem the
corporation an alien because it only applies to capital “S” states.
(2) Plugging it into the subcategories
Having determined the citizenship of the international corporation above, I now
evaluate the result under the § 1332(a) subcategories, comparing the results under my
approach with the results reached in Part II and with the law before the deeming
provisions. The reader should assume the existence of no unmentioned parties that might
trigger § 1332(a)(3).
Foreign corporation with PPB in State X v. U.S. Citizen Domiciled in State X.
Under my approach, the foreign corporation has dual citizenship, as both an alien and
State X citizen. Because citizens of State X appear on both sides, jurisdiction fails. This
result is not controversial.99 Jurisdiction fails because the foreign corporation is deemed
a citizen of State X, and it matters not whether it is deemed [only] or [also] a citizen of
State X.
Foreign corporation with PPB in State X v. Nonresident Alien. Under my
approach, again, the foreign corporation has dual citizenship, as both an alien and State X
citizen. Because aliens appear on both sides and because § 1332(a)(3) does not apply,
jurisdiction fails. In this scenario, the choice of bracketed words matters. If the foreign
corporation is deemed [only] a citizen of State X, the corporate deeming provision strips
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the corporation of alien status, and pure alienage jurisdiction exists under § 1332(a)(2).
Most, but not all, courts have agreed with my conclusion.100
Finding no jurisdiction is the better answer. First, before 1958, jurisdiction would
not have existed, and the historical context and reasonable inferences from the text and
structure suggest that Congress intended to reduce, not expand, jurisdiction. Second, just
lines below the corporate deeming provision, another provision deems estate
representatives “only” citizens of certain states, suggesting—at the very least —that
courts should search for a principled basis before determining that “shall be deemed”
means “shall be deemed [only].”101 Another reason for refusing jurisdiction is bound up
with the construction of the permanent-resident deeming provision. As discussed in the
next subpart, compelling constitutional-avoidance reasons exist to read the permanentresident deeming provision as “deemed [also],” and thus consistency and coherence
support the same reading of the corporate deeming provision.
Corporation incorporated in State X with PPB abroad v. U.S. Citizen Domiciled
in State X. Under my approach, the corporation has a single citizenship, in State X.
Because citizens of State X appear on both sides, jurisdiction fails. This result is not
controversial because even if one were to consider the corporation a dual citizen,
jurisdiction would still fail because State X citizens would be on both sides.
Corporation incorporated in State X with PPB abroad v. Nonresident Alien.
Under my approach, the corporation has a single citizenship, in State X. Thus, pure
100
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alienage jurisdiction exists under § 1332(a)(2) between a State citizen (the corporation)
and an alien (the nonresident alien). The courts that have squarely addressed the issue
agree.102 Some courts, however, in dicta have suggested that a domestically incorporated
corporation with a principal place of business abroad also has dual citizenship.103 No
legal basis supports this conclusion. Before 1958, a corporation was a citizen only of its
State or foreign country of incorporation. The corporate deeming provision deems the
corporation a citizen of any capital-S State where it is incorporated and (if it has a
domestic principal place of business) of the capital-S State where it has its principal place
of business.104 Neither the corporate deeming provision nor pre-1958 law creates alien
status for a corporation that has its principal place of business abroad.
Conceptually, some may find troubling the distinction between a domestically
incorporated corporation with a principal place of business abroad and a foreign
corporation with a domestic principal place of business. But the alternative constructions
of the current statute are more troubling.105 For simplicity and to treat all corporations
equally, courts could follow the alternative suggested in dicta in the immediately
preceding paragraph and simply give all international corporations dual citizenships. The
problem with that approach is there is no basis for doing so.106 This alternative doesn’t
merely choose between permissible interpretations of the law, it makes a new law.
102
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Second, courts could avoid the distinction by reading the corporate deeming provision as
deeming international corporations [only] a citizen of capital S states. This alternative is
troubling for the reasons outlined earlier. The most unsatisfactory alternative is the one
that seems to pervade many of the opinions in this area—because the text is unclear,
we’ll just ask if exercising jurisdiction in this situation would be wise. Certainly, when
determining a statute’s meaning courts must consider the potential effects of various
constructions. Words mean nothing in isolation, and evaluating the impact of words is
one way to determine the most reasonable construction to give to those words. But the
end goal remains giving meaning to the words. In the alienage area (especially in the
permanent-resident context), some courts have gone astray. They have spotted an
ambiguity, evaluated the impact of finding or rejecting jurisdiction, and then concluded.
But they have never returned to the text, even for a post-hoc justification of how the
result comports with the statutory language. Further, even if flexible, functional
approaches are sometimes desirable, they have no place in jurisdictional inquiries. As
Judge Posner wrote:
Functional approaches to legal questions are often, perhaps generally preferable to
mechanical rules; but the preference is reversed when it comes to jurisdiction.
When it is uncertain whether a case is within the jurisdiction of a particular court
system, not only are the cost and complexity of litigation increased by the
necessity of conducting an inquiry that will dispel the uncertainty, but the parties
will often find themselves having to start their litigation over from the beginning,
perhaps after it has gone all the way through to judgment. Jurisdictional rules
ought to be simple and precise so that judges and lawyers are spared having to
litigate over not the merits of a legal dispute but where and when those merits
shall be litigated. The more mechanical the application of a jurisdiction rule, the
better. The chief and often the only virtue of a jurisdictional rule is clarity.107
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Summarized simply, the words “shall be deemed” in the corporate deeming
provision give a corporation citizenship in certain States, but do not remove preexisting
alien status. The permanent-resident deeming provision operates similarly.
B. Permanent-Resident Aliens
Before Congress added the permanent-resident deeming provision in 1988, an
alien was an alien. That is, if a litigant was a “citizen or subject of a foreign state,” the
litigant was an alien.108 Before 1988, neither an alien’s domicile nor status as a
permanent resident affected the alien’s citizenship under § 1332. Thus, before 1988,
once a court determined that a litigant was a citizen or subject of a foreign state, the court
simply classified that litigant as an alien, classified the remaining parties, and looked to
the § 1332(a) subcategories. What effect did the permanent-resident deeming provision
have on an alien’s classification? The permanent-resident deeming provision provides
that: “[A]n alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a
citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.”109 Unquestionably, a nonresident
alien is still an alien. A nonresident alien’s domicile is still irrelevant--a nonresident
alien domiciled in State A neither loses her alien status nor gains State A citizenship. But
while a nonresident alien’s domicile is irrelevant, once an alien has been admitted for
permanent residence,110 the alien’s domicile does impact the citizenship classification.
This Subpart will proceed in the same manner as the previous one. First, I will
summarize the citizenship classification of permanent-resident aliens under my
108
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construction of the permanent-resident deeming provision. Then I will detail how the
citizenship determination interacts with the subsections and how my approach comports
with the results most courts have reached in the categories described in Part II. In
Subpart C, I will evaluate my solution on a larger scale, considering the overall impact of
my construction on both deeming provisions.
(1) Classifying the citizenship of permanent-resident aliens
As I’ve used the term “alien” when discussing the subcategories, an alien is a
citizen or subject of a foreign state. The question is what impact the permanent-resident
deeming provision has on the citizenship classification of a permanent-resident alien
domiciled in a State. My approach treats the words “shall be deemed” in the permanentresident deeming provision the same as the same words in the corporate deeming
provision. The permanent-resident deeming provision adds citizenship in the State where
the alien is domiciled, but does not remove preexisting alien status—the litigant is, after
all, still a citizen or subject of a foreign state Thus, while a nonresident alien is just an
alien, a permanent-resident alien domiciled in State A has dual citizenship, as both an
alien and a Citizen of State X.
I expect the reader to meet this suggestion of an individual with dual citizenship
with some resistance. But the alternatives are unsatisfactory, as detailed throughout this
and the next Subpart. The dual-citizen result is permissible under the statutory text and
avoids the problems raised by alternative constructions.111
Starting with the text, one thing again becomes apparent. The bracketed word is
missing. Is a permanent-resident alien domiciled in State A deemed [only] a Citizen of
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State X?

Or, does the permanent-resident alien retain her alien status while being

deemed [also] a Citizen of State X? If anything, the bracketed [also] is a more natural
reading, given the express inclusion of the phrase “shall be deemed only” in § 1332(c)(2),
which provides that the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be deemed to
be a citizen only of the same State as the decedent, and the legal representative of an
infant or incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the infant
or incompetent.”112 Neither approach is textually demanded. While many of the cases
detailed in Part II describe the “clear” or “unambiguous text” as favoring one result, those
cases never critically evaluate the language or explain just what about the text is clear.
Judge Diane Wood recently got it right, concluding that: “some aliens will have two
citizenships for diversity purposes rather than one: that of their home country, and that of
the U.S. State in which they are domiciled.”113
I will now apply this construction to the scenarios in Part II, demonstrate how my
approach produces results consistent with the majority results in those scenarios, and
evaluate counterarguments under each scenario on a smaller scale.
(2) Plugging it into the subcategories
Three common variations involving permanent-resident aliens exist. The reader
should assume the existence of no unmentioned parties that might trigger § 1332(a)(3).
Permanent-resident alien domiciled in State X v. U.S. Citizen domiciled in State
X. Under my approach, the permanent-resident alien has dual citizenship, as both an
alien and a State X citizen. Because citizens of State X appear on both sides, jurisdiction
fails. This result is not controversial. Jurisdiction fails because the permanent-resident
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alien is deemed a citizen of State X, and it matters not whether she is deemed [only] or
[also] a citizen of State X. Indeed, this is the precise scenario targeted by the
provision,114 and courts unanimously agree that jurisdiction does not exist here.115
Permanent-resident alien domiciled in State X v. Nonresident Alien. Under my
approach, the permanent-resident alien has dual citizenship, as both an alien and State X
citizen. Because aliens appear on both sides and because § 1332(a)(3) does not apply,
jurisdiction fails. In this scenario, the choice of the bracketed words matters. If the
permanent-resident alien is deemed [only] a citizen of State X, the permanent-resident
deeming provision strips the permanent-resident alien of alien status, and pure alienage
jurisdiction exists under § 1332(a)(2). Most courts, including the DC Circuit, have
agreed with my conclusion, but have failed to reconcile their results with the text.116 A
few courts, including the Third Circuit, have disagreed, but have failed to reconcile their
results with the text, instead using adverbial shortcuts like “clearly” and
“unambiguously.”117
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Finding no jurisdiction in this situation is the better answer. First, before 1958,
jurisdiction would not have existed because an alien was an alien. Historical context and
reasonable inferences from the text and structure suggest that Congress intended to
reduce, not expand, jurisdiction. Specifically, the legislative history (consistent with my
reading of the text) suggests that Congress wrote the permanent-resident deeming
provision to merely remove one category of cases from § 1332—those cases where a
permanent-resident alien domiciled in a State sues a United States citizen domiciled in
the same State. Under my construction, this is all the amendment does. Second, as
noted, the permanent-resident deeming provision does not contain the shall be deemed
“only” language that appears elsewhere, and yet, only by removing the permanentresident alien’s alien status can a court fit this scenario into one of the subcategories.
Most importantly, reading the provision to not divest the permanent-resident alien
of alien status avoids the constitutional questions that pervade in this area. “[W]hen
deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider
the necessary consequences of its choice. If one of them would raise . . . constitutional
problems, the other should prevail.”118 Article III § 2 authorizes Congress to confer
jurisdiction over suits between citizens of different States and between a citizen of a State
and an alien,119 but it does not authorize Congress to confer jurisdiction over a suit
between only aliens.120 If the permanent-resident alien is deemed only a citizen of the
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State of his permanent residence, a lawsuit exists between two persons who are aliens for
all purposes except § 1332. While Congress ultimately defines citizenship for
immigration purposes, surely some limits govern the extent to which Congress can
sidestep Article III § 2’s limits by “deeming” a person a citizen solely for the purpose of
a lawsuit.121 Could Congress deem an alien a citizen of any State in which the alien files
a lawsuit? There’s no need to resolve the constitutional question—the statute is
ambiguous and the mere existence of this plausible constitutional challenge favors not
reading an [only] into the statute. The [also] construction eliminates the possibility of an
unconstitutional result because it does not remove alien status for purposes of a lawsuit.
The Singh case is the leading case approving of jurisdiction in this area.122 The
Singh court erred in two fundamental ways. First, by using adverbial and adjectival
shortcuts, the court concluded that the text is “clear” without parsing the text.123
According to the court, the statute clearly deems the permanent-resident alien a citizen of
his state of domicile.124 But that’s not the dispute. Rather, the dispute is (or at least
should be) about whether the permanent-resident alien is deemed only a citizen of that
State.
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The second and more troubling error appeared in the court’s even-if-the-statute-isambiguous alternative discussion, where the courtwrongly discarded the canon of
constitutional doubt, endorsing a chameleon approach since rejected by the Supreme
Court in Clark v. Martinez.125 The Singh party alignment was slightly different than the
hypothetical we have been evaluating (permanent-resident alien domiciled in State X v.
nonresident alien). In the Singh variation, the permanent-resident alien domiciled in State
X sued an alien and a citizen of State Y. The court refused to apply the canon of
constitutional doubt. The court correctly noted that, because of the additional party’s
presence, finding jurisdiction in the case would not violate Article III because minimal
diversity was present.126 But the court erred by relying upon that distinction to refuse to
apply the canon. The statute must mean the same thing regardless of whether an
additional party happens to be present. The canon of constitutional doubt “is a tool for
choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the
reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative, which raises serious
constitutional questions.”127 The reasonable presumption is used to divine congressional
intent, which has nothing to do with which parties are before the court. As Justice Scalia
recently clarified, “when deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions to
adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of its choice. If one of them
would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other should prevail—whether or
not those constitutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before the Court.”128
Under the Singh approach, the statute may have meant something different had an
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additional party not been present. Such an approach distorts the role of statutory
interpretation, “render[ing] every statute a chameleon, its meaning subject to change
depending upon the presence or absence of constitutional concerns in each individual
case.”129
In summary, jurisdiction fails when a permanent-resident alien sues a nonresident
alien. The “shall be deemed” language operates the same here as it did when we
evaluated whether a foreign corporation with a principal place of business in State X
could sue a nonresident alien. Both the corporation and the permanent-resident alien are
deemed citizens of State X, but not deemed [only.] Rather, they both retain their
preexisting alien status. This construction avoids constitutional problems and is an
equally plausible reading of the statutory text.
Finally, one obscure area that borders alien-jurisdiction law deserves mention,
namely the area of dual nationals. Because of the nuances of the law of international
relations, an individual can be a “citizen or subject” of multiple nations. Several courts
have encountered such situations, and “there is an emerging consensus among courts that,
for a dual national citizen, only the American citizenship is relevant for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction,”130 though an exception may exist when the foreign citizenship is
“dominant.”131 Even assuming these cases are correctly decided, they should not
influence the construction of the permanent-resident deeming provision, which presents a
different question. The dual-nationals cases involve the courts’ struggles with
reconciling the term “citizen or subject” of a foreign state with immigration policy, which
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“abhors dual citizenship,”132 and the law of international relations. Conversely, in the
deeming provision, Congress expressly targeted foreign citizens and conferred State
citizenship upon them
when they are permanent residents . No inference need be drawn
about substantive immigration policy because the provision, by definition, does not apply
to persons who are “abhorrent” dual citizens; rather, it applies only when the case
involves someone who satisfies the congressional definition of permanent resident, which
of course expects to find a person who is a citizen or subject of a foreign state.
Permanent-resident alien domiciled in State X v. permanent-resident alien
domiciled in State Y. No reported cases discuss this scenario, and the following
discussion is largely academic. But it raises some troubling structural issues with § 1332
and its subcategories.
Under my approach, both litigants have dual citizenship, they are both aliens and
citizens of their respective states of domicile. Because aliens are present on both sides,
jurisdiction fails unless the case satisfies § 1332(a)(3). Section 1332(a)(3) grants
jurisdiction when the suit is between “citizens of different States and in which citizens or
subjects of a foreign state are additional parties.” The parties are citizens of different
states, but jurisdiction apparently fails because there are no aliens as additional parties—
the aliens are the same parties. So jurisdiction fails, right?
To explore how (a)(3) interacts with dual-citizenship litigants, consider a simple
example. Suppose our plaintiff is a United States Citizen domiciled in State X. Our
defendant is a corporation incorporated abroad and having a principal place of business in
State Y. The defendant is a dual citizen, both an alien and a State Y citizen. Jurisdiction
obviously exists, but under what subsection? Not under pure diversity jurisdiction,
132
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because aliens are parties, and not under pure alienage jurisdiction, because State citizens
appear on both sides. Jurisdiction can only exist under (a)(3). But the corporation is not
an “additional party.” It is tempting to argue that we can find jurisdiction by combining
(a)(1) and (a)(2), but that would effectively read (a)(3) out of the statute, and would
create more conceptual difficulties. If the answer is that we treat dual-citizenship parties
as two separate parties for purposes of (a)(3), then (a)(3) would authorize jurisdiction in
our suit between permanent-resident aliens. Indeed, if we continue with that
construction, jurisdiction would exist between two alien corporations having principal
places of business in different states. If the answer is that the aliens must truly be
“additional parties,” then where do we find jurisdiction in our corporate example?
These problems are ancillary, and largely academic, but they illustrate that no
solution is perfect. Importantly, the existence of these problems does not support the
alternate construction. The deemed [also] solution eliminates the constitutional problems
in the scenarios where it has arisen and, practically, where it is likely to arise again. The
following, final, Subpart evaluates my solution overall and responds to additional
criticism
s.
(C) A cohesive result
Having exhausted the details, I now summarize my construction of the words
“shall be deemed” and how my construction yields a cohesive, desirable result.
The words “shall be deemed” perform a simple function in the deeming
provisions, i.e., they confer State citizenship on certain litigants. If a corporation is
incorporated in a State, it is a citizen of that State. If a corporation has its principal place
of business in a State, it is a citizen of that State. If a permanent-resident alien is
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domiciled in a State, she is a citizen of that State. But the words “shall be deemed” do
not strip a party of preexisting alien status. That is, the words “shall be deemed” do not
mean “shall be deemed [only].” If an alien was an alien before Congress passed the
deeming provision, the alien remains an alien and is deemed [also] a citizen of a State.
Thus, neither of the deeming provisions create jurisdiction where it did not exist
before Congress passed the deeming provision. The statutory structure, historical
context, and legislative history surrounding the provisions support the idea that Congress
enacted the deeming provisions to carve out certain essentially local disputes from §
1332. Under my approach (as illustrated by the chart) that is all the deeming provisions
do. They leave other scenarios unchanged, never creating jurisdiction where it did not
exist before.
My approach avoids the constitutional problems raised by the alternative
approach in the permanent-resident-alien context. If the deeming provision strips a
permanent-resident alien of her alien status, serious constitutional questions arise about
Congress’s Article III power to confer jurisdiction. My approach avoids that question.
My approach facilitates consistency among the deeming provisions in § 1332. By
reading the two deeming provisions together, the same words can be given the same
meaning. And by reading the two provisions to mean “shall be deemed [also],”
significance is given to other provisions of § 1332 that expressly state “shall be deemed
only.”
My approach is textually faithful. The statute is ambiguous. But that ambiguity
is not a license to merely search for congressional intent without reference to the text.
When a statute is ambiguous, the courts must choose between plausible interpretations.
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That means discerning what the statue might reasonably mean, and then choosing one of
those meanings, not saying that the meaning is unclear and then concluding that
jurisdiction would be wisely exercised. One might conjure up certain scenarios, where in
the view of the conjurer, exercising jurisdiction would better serve the purposes of
alienage jurisdiction. But the desirability of results cannot distort the task—giving effect
to the statute.

It is plausible to read the statute as deeming litigants [also] or [only]

citizens of certain states. But one approach must prevail, and for the reasons I’ve
presented, the [also] answer is the better one. A consistent construction must be chosen;
“to give these same words a different meaning [in different circumstances] would be to
invent a statute rather than to interpret one.”133
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